Comparing Insider Trading in the US and Europe

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2014-06-19


Editor's Note: The following post comes to us from Guido Rossi, former Chairman of the Consob (Italian SEC), and Marco Ventoruzzo of Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law, and Bocconi University.

In the European Union insider trading has been regulated much more recently than in the United States, and it can be argued that, at least traditionally, it has been more aggressively and successfully enforced in the United States than in the European Union. Several different explanations have been offered for this difference in enforcement attitudes, focusing in particular on resources of regulators devoted to contrasting this practice, but also diverging cultural attitudes toward insiders. This situation has evolved, however, and the prohibition of insider trading has gained traction also in Europe. Few studies have focused on the substantive differences in the regulation of the phenomenon on the two sides of the Atlantic.

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academic research comparative corporate governance & regulation international corporate governance & regulation securities litigation & enforcement securities regulation eu europe fiduciary duties guido rossi insider trading international governance marco ventoruzzo sec sec v. dorozhko section 10(b) securities enforcement


June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,

Date tagged:

06/19/2014, 10:50

Date published:

06/19/2014, 09:24