Incentives and Ideology

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2014-06-23

Summary:

Editor's Note: The following post comes to us from James Kwak at University of Connecticut School of Law.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 prompted a tidal wave of thinking about financial regulation. One major theme that has been pursued by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, journalists, and scholars—most recently in Other People’s Houses, by Jennifer Taub—is the question of what went wrong in the years or decades leading up the crisis. A second strand of research answers the question of what substantive regulations we should have; one important book in this genre is The Banker’s New Clothes, by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig. But beyond the issue of what regulations are appropriate for today’s complex financial system, a third important area of inquiry is the political and administrative landscape in which financial regulations (whether statutes, rules, administrative guidances, or court opinions) are hammered out. After all, if it were somehow possible to design a perfect regulatory framework, it could only become effective by navigating through the complicated web of interests and incentives that encompasses the legislative and executive (and perhaps judicial) branches.

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Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/23/incentives-and-ideology/

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Blogs.law Aggregation Hub » The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Tags:

academic research banking & financial institutions financial crisis financial regulation financial institutions financial reform james kwak lobbying political spending regulators social capital

Authors:

June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,

Date tagged:

06/23/2014, 14:20

Date published:

06/23/2014, 09:09