Audit Committee Elections

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2013-05-17

Summary:

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Ronen Gal-Or and Udi Hoitash, both of the Accounting Group at Northeastern University, and Rani Hoitash of the Department of Accountancy at Bentley University.

In our paper, Audit Committee Elections, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether and in what ways shareholder votes in the elections of directors who sit on the audit committee (AC) are associated with the effectiveness of the audit committee. Within the board, the audit committee is responsible for monitoring the financial reporting process. This process involves oversight over the external auditor, internal controls and overall quality of the financial reports. Aside from voting in director elections, shareholders can do very little to influence or signal their satisfaction to the AC. Yet, research examining director elections does not generally focus on the AC. In this study we aim to fill this void.

Click here to read the complete post...

Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/05/17/audit-committee-elections/

From feeds:

Blogs.law Aggregation Hub » The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Tags:

academic research accounting & disclosure boards of directors accounting corporate elections & voting shareholder voting internal control audit committee director qualifications rani hoitash udi hoitash ronen gal-or

Authors:

R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,

Date tagged:

05/17/2013, 12:00

Date published:

05/17/2013, 09:21