“Pay for Investment”: Looking to the Long Term

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2013-08-12


Editor's Note: Joseph Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder, with assistance from Andy Tsang, which first appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Today's post considers what might be done in the design of executive pay to encourage commitment by executives to the longer-term interests of their employers.

A very interesting examination into design features in an incentive program that puts emphasis on long-term considerations of executive pay is contained in the proxy statement for Goldman Sachs. (Elements of this program discussed below have been developed by Goldman Sachs over a period of years—the CD&A section of the 2013 proxy statement provides a description of the program.) Following are two interesting aspects of that program.

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practitioner publications incentives executive compensation pay for performance management executive performance joseph bachelder goldman sachs andy tsang mccarter & english long-term value


Joseph E. Bachelder III, McCarter & English, LLP,

Date tagged:

08/12/2013, 12:30

Date published:

08/12/2013, 09:27