Governance Through Threat

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2013-10-07

Summary:

Editor's Note: The following post comes to us from Massimo Massa, Professor of Finance at INSEAD, Bohui Zhang of the Australian School of Business at the University of New South Wales, and Hong Zhang of the Finance Area at INSEAD.

The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the role of financial markets in disciplining managers. Shareholders—particularly blockholders—may induce good managerial behavior by exiting and pushing down stock prices when bad managerial actions are taken (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011). In this regard, informed trading (“exit”) provides an alternative governance mechanism that shareholders can adopt in addition to the traditional “intervention” type of internal governance (e.g., Parrino et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007; McCahery et al., 2010). Indeed, to some extent, exit and intervention offer substituting governance mechanisms that shareholders can select based on their trade-off between benefits and costs (e.g., Edmans and Manso, 2011; Edmans et al., 2013).

In our paper, Governance Through Threat: Does Short Selling Improve Internal Governance?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study how “trading-based governance” affects internal governance through the channel of short selling. Using a simple model, we argue that the threat of short-selling attacks triggered by bad managerial actions pushes existing shareholders to better control management, either through improved internal governance or via enhanced equity compensation. Thus, short-selling-based discipline mechanisms are complementary with, instead of substituting for, internal governance.

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Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/07/governance-through-threat/

From feeds:

Blogs.law Aggregation Hub » The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Tags:

academic research empirical research general governance internal control equity-based compensation blockholders short sales bohui zhang hong zhang massimo massa

Authors:

R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,

Date tagged:

10/07/2013, 14:40

Date published:

10/07/2013, 09:14