Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2013-10-09

Summary:

Editor's Note: The following post comes to us from Alex Edmans, Professor of Finance at the London Business School, Vivian Fang of the Department of Accounting at the University of Minnesota, and Katharina Lewellen of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.

In our paper, Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we study the link between real investment decisions and the vesting horizon of a CEO’s equity incentives. We find that research and development (“R&D”) is negatively associated with the stock price sensitivity of stock and options that vest over the course of the same year. This association continues to hold when including advertising and capital expenditure in the investment measure. Moreover, CEOs with significant newly-vesting equity are more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus forecasts by a narrow margin. However, the market recognizes such CEOs’ incentives to inflate earnings—the lower announcement returns to meet or beating earnings forecasts are decreasing in the sensitivity of vesting equity. These results provide empirical support for managerial myopia theories.

Many academics and practitioners believe that managerial myopia is a first-order problem faced by the modern firm. While the 20th century firm emphasized cost efficiency, Porter (1992) argues that “the nature of competition has changed, placing a premium on investment in increasingly complex and intangible forms," such as innovation, employee training, and organizational development. However, the myopia theories of Stein (1988, 1989) show that managers may fail to invest due to concerns with the firm’s short-term stock price. Since the benefits of intangible investment are only visible in the long run, the immediate effect of such investment is to depress earnings and thus the current stock price. Therefore, a manager aligned with the short-term stock price may turn down valuable investment opportunities.

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Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/09/equity-vesting-and-managerial-myopia/

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Blogs.law Aggregation Hub » The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Tags:

academic research empirical research incentives executive compensation management katharina lewellen r&d equity-based compensation alex edmans short-termism vivian fang

Authors:

R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,

Date tagged:

10/09/2013, 12:50

Date published:

10/09/2013, 09:30