Ten Myths of “Say on Pay”

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2012-09-28


Editor’s Note: David Larcker is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting at Stanford University.

In the paper, Ten Myths of "Say on Pay", my co-authors (Allan McCall, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Brian Tayan) and I review many widely held misconceptions regarding the shareholder voting practice called “say on pay.” “Say on pay” is a prominent issue today, given its unique position at the intersection of executive compensation and shareholder democracy—two topics which themselves are of deep interest to investors, stakeholder, regulators, and the media. Despite this interest, several misconceptions have developed which continue to be commonly accepted. Fortunately, academics have devoted considerable effort studying “say on pay,” shareholder democracy, and executive compensation. As a result, a lengthy empirical record exists against which “say on pay” can be examined. Our intention is to review “say on pay” in light of the scientific evidence so that practitioners have a better understanding of the limits and consequences of granting shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation.

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academic research corporate elections & voting executive compensation pay for performance david larcker say on pay shareholder voting


David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business,

Date tagged:

09/28/2012, 09:50

Date published:

09/28/2012, 08:59