R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2012-12-28

Summary:

Editor’s Note: Gordon Phillips is a Professor of Finance at the University of Southern California.

In the paper, R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Services, my co-author (Alexei Zhdanov of the University of Lausanne and the Swiss Finance Institute) and I examine how the incentives to innovate differ between large and small firms and whether the M&A market hinders or promotes innovative activity. Previous literature has documented that R&D and innovation decreases post-acquisition and has attributed this effect to large firms stifling innovative activity. Using recent data on pre-merger R&D activity, we show that this view is flawed. Rather than large firms stifling R&D by small firms, we show theoretically and empirically how mergers can stimulate R&D activity of small firms. Thus, ex ante R&D rises and then falls naturally after acquisition as the pre-merger stimulus effect wears off.

Click here to read the complete post...

Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/24/rd-and-the-incentives-from-merger-and-acquisition-activity/

From feeds:

Blogs.law Aggregation Hub » The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Tags:

innovation mergers & acquisitions academic research empirical research incentives r&d gordon phillips

Authors:

Gordon Phillips, University of Southern California,

Date tagged:

12/28/2012, 12:49

Date published:

12/24/2012, 09:49