Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation 2014-05-27

Summary:

Editor's Note: E. Han Kim is Professor of Finance at the University of Michigan.

Worker participation in corporate governance varies across countries. While employees are rarely represented on corporate boards in most countries, Botero et al. (2004) state “workers, or unions, or both have a right to appoint members to the Board of Directors” in Austria, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden. Such board representation gives labor a means to influence corporate policies, which may affect productivity, risk sharing, and how the economic pie is shared between providers of capital and labor.

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Link:

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/05/27/labor-representation-in-governance-as-an-insurance-mechanism/

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Tags:

academic research boards of directors empirical research international corporate governance & regulation board composition e. han kim employees europe germany insurance international governance labor markets risk shocks

Authors:

E. Han Kim, University of Michigan, Ross School of Business,

Date tagged:

05/27/2014, 14:30

Date published:

05/27/2014, 09:12