"National Language" in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Language Log 2019-12-14

Many people have been asking me about the use of the term Guóyǔ 国语 ("National Language") for "Mandarin" in Xinjiang today.  Here's an inquiry from Peter Moody:

I have encountered what seems to be an anomaly in contemporary Chinese usage, and have been assured that you are among those most capable of addressing it.

I was reading an analysis by a Darren Byler, a "Xinjiang Scholar," of a 2017 classified directive from Zhu Hailun, Gauleiter of Xinjiang, on how properly to run the concentration camps in that territory (https://supchina.com/2019/12/04/a-xinjiang-scholars-close-reading-of-the-china-cables/). (I have not looked either at the full English translation of these directives, or the Chinese text, although both are available. I figured the analysis would give the gist of them.)

In Section 8 of the directives, Zhu is cited to the effect that the educational program in the camps must stress Guóyǔ 国语 ("National Language"), according to Byler "a term that is used to replace Hànyǔ 汉语 (literally, "Han Language"). I can understand that in the context Hanyu would not go down too well. But I had been under the impression that Guoyu was Taiwan usage or, actually, KMT usage going back at least to the 1930s. The preferred term on the mainland, I thought, was Pǔtōnghuà 普通话 ("Common Speech"). I read a study some years ago by S. Robert Ramsey on contemporary Chinese linguistics discussing the (rather minor) differences between the two. Also, I think, Ramsey said the distinction had ideological implications, although I don't remember what they were and my reading notes from that time are all packed away somewhere.

I haven't seen any hints anywhere that the internal documents coming out of Xinjiang have been faked, although this may arouse at least the hint of a doubt. Do you know whether the term Guoyu has continued to be used on the mainland, or is it coming back into use, or what? I guess this is a small thing, but my curiosity has been piqued.

And here's my reply to him:

These are good questions.

As a matter of fact, a lot of people are perplexed by this surfacing of Guóyǔ 国语 in the context of the Xinjiang concentration camps.

So far I haven't determined a definitive reason why the CCP has decided to resurrect / popularize Guóyǔ 国语 in that context.

Here are some explanations I've encountered:

1. Hànyǔ 汉语 comes across as too "Han-centric" (but why should the CCP care about that since many observers feel that they are committing culturecide, if not genocide, against the Uyghurs anyway?)

2. Guóyǔ 国语 emphasizes the state, the nation (but it's so wrapped up with the KMT / Republic of China; why would the CCP want that?)

3. What's wrong with Pǔtōnghuà 普通话?  Some people say that it's too closely identified with the CCP.

4. Maybe the CCP is doing this as a way to seduce Taiwan into thinking they care about the speakers of Mandarin on Formosa.

I'll be thinking more about this and will get back to you if I can come up with any better explanations.

I proceeded to ask my colleagues on the Xinjiang Studies (XJS) list what they thought the reason for this striking use of the term Guóyǔ 国语 for "Mandarin" is in the context of the Xinjiang concentration camps.  It just seems so bizarre for the CCP to be at all sentimental about this, yet there must be some reason in their minds for using "Guóyǔ 国语" instead of "Hànyǔ 汉语" or "Pǔtōnghuà 普通话".

James Millward, a member of XJS, wrote back this morning (Saturday the 14th):

The increasing use of the term guoyu 国语 for what was once generally called Hanyu 汉语 (even, in Xinjiang vernacular sometimes, 汉话)and putonghua (common speech) 普通话 fits into a broader ideological shift in China: the rise of the Xi / CCP centered party-state cult, and the deemphasizing of the former minzu system, rhetorically but now even institutionally) in favor of the pan-Chinese national identity Zhonghua minzu 中华民族 . This is evident in many ways: Xi's playing up of Confucianistic language and rituals; the push for "national studies" 国学 in universities, the sinicization 中国化 of religion campaign with its odd focus on domes and other architectural features of mosques as "Arab" and therefore to be expunged as well as the anti-Halal and de-Saudification campaign and similar attacks on Christian architecture; the flag-raising ceremonies and mandatory posting of lists of Xi quotes and CCP aphorisms in religious institutions. On the popular level, the Hanfu "Chinese clothing" movement that Kevin Carrico wrote about, reflects a kind of popular Han "white nationalism" arising around similar sentiments, though often arrayed in southern China against the use of Cantonese (if I remember Kevin's book correctly).

Here, the switch to "guoyu" has little or nothing to do with the KMT / Guomindang use of the term, and CCP now is on very good terms with the KMT in any case, deploying means both open and surreptitious to interfere in Taiwan's elections on behalf of the KMT presidential candidate. (This raises a question–is guoyu still the common term for "Chinese language" used in Taiwan? Incidentally–that KMT candidate's given name is in fact Kuo-yu, and he's running against someone named Ying-wen–the pun only works in Romanization).

In the Xinjiang context, the argument is this: Uyghurs need to learn the "national language," therefore extraordinary measures must be taken. Besides guoyu, another term one hears and reads often is 国家共同语言 the national common language–which has a slightly different, more nationalistic, connotation than "common speech" 普通话。The goal, I assume, is to disassociate Mandarin from the Han minzu per se, and to argue through terminology that the "common national language" is that which much be spoken by all Zhonghua minzu. It's nativism challenging the institutional and linguistic legacy of a formerly pluralist system (though pluralism often only observed in the breach) and similar in many ways to Modi's Hindutva in India, which is claiming, contrary to founding principles of modern India, that Hinduism and the Hindu language are the national religion and language of India. In China, it's the CCP cult and northern Mandarin that are now being raised up as central and supreme to other beliefs and languages.

Usually states teach "the national language" to kids in schools. PRC has had 70 years to do that, but according to its own rhetoric, the effort has apparently been an abject failure in Xinjiang. Now, then, they argue that middle-aged men must learn mandarin in concentration camps aka "concentrated educational transformation training centers."

There's a Chinese-language bilingual charter school in DC called Yuying.  I met a kid who's been going there for a few years (her parents brought her to a party at my house).  She speaks pretty good conversational Mandarin. I asked her what they called the language, e.g. when the teachers scold them "don't speak English, speak Chinese," how do they say that in Chinese?   Her response was "Zhongwen"  "中文。  我们必须说中文。"    That's a sample size of one, and she's five years old, but I'd be curious what the generic term for "Chinese" is in Mandarin in these schools and similar settings outside of PRC and Taiwan.  "Zhongwen" is used for the spoken language as well as written, and does more or less avoid ethno-national connotations.

All of this give much food for thought about which way the CCP / PRC is moving, both politically and linguistically.