The theory crisis in physics compared to the replication crisis in social science: Two different opinion-field inversions that differ in some important ways

Yesterday we discussed an “opinion-field inversion” in theoretical physics: in the prestige news media and publicity complex (NPR, Ted, etc), string theory reigns supreme; in elite physics departments, string theory is where it’s at, but then there’s a middle range of skeptics ranging from my Columbia colleague Peter “Not Even Wrong” Woit to xkcd columnist Randall Munroe who characterize string theory as an overhyped nothingburger. I guess that Woit would be cool with some elite physicists studying string theory as part of the overall portfolio of theoretical research, but he and others in this middle ground think that whatever profile string theory should have, both in academia and in public perceptions of physics, should be much lower.

I referred to this sort of layered difference in public opinion as an opinion-field inversion, by analogy to the phenomenon of temperature inversion that is a precursor to tornadoes.

The thoery crisis in physics

Before going on, let me emphasize that I know nothing of theoretical physics. I find Woit’s writing on the topic persuasive, but I’ve not tried to understand any of the debate in physics terms. I’m only discussing this from the perspective of sociology of science.

I’ll call it the theory crisis in physics, by analogy to the replication crisis in social science and medical research. The string theory thing isn’t a replication crisis—indeed, one of the main criticisms of string theory is that it does not make new testable predictions, so there’s no possibility of replication or falsification–but it’s still a crisis. I think the term “theory crisis” is about right.

Arguably the replication crisis in psychology and economics is also a theory crisis, in that the work is based on broad theories such as embodied cognition and evolutionary psychology that have major problems of the sort that they can be used to explain any possible result, but it was the failed replications that were the convincer to many people, hence the term “replication crisis” rather than “theory crisis” or “methods crisis.”

The replication crisis as another opinion-field inversion

In any case, another example of an opinion-field inversion in science, at least until recently, was woo-woo psychology such as social priming and walking speed, ovulation and voting, air rage, power pose, himmicanes, ages ending in 9, signing at the top of the form, etc. The news media and associated institutions (Ted, Freakonomics, etc.) were all-in on these things; informed scientists such as Uri Simonsohn, Anna Dreber, and various other so-called methodological terrorists were very skeptical; and the power centers at Harvard, PNAS, etc., were a mix of head-in-the-sand true believers (claiming the replication rate “is statistically indistinguishable from 100%”) and I’ve-got-mine-don’t-rock-the-boat nudgelords, who seemed to be more concerned about keeping their Henry Kissinger party invitations and positions on NPR speed-dial than in cleaning up their house.

With junk science, things have changed–more and more reporters seem to be tired of having their chains yanked by whatever Psychological Science and PNAS happen to be promoting this week–and I guess that’s partly a consequence of the opinion inversion. Shaking up the power centers might be more of a challenge.

Differences between the theory crisis in physics and the replication crisis in psychology and economics

What will happen with string theory, I don’t know. One difference is that in psychology and economics, my impression is that the people who do this sort of headline-bait are not taken very seriously at an intellectual level. They may have institutional power (hi, Robert Sternberg!) and others in their field may enjoy the reflected glow of their TV appearances, but nobody would consider them to be the brightest lights in the chandelier. In contrast, it seems that many of the physicists who work in string theory are considered to be brilliant, most notably Ed Witten—I know nothing of his work, it’s all beyond me, but he’s always described in superlatives.

So if string theory really is a hyped dead end, it’s a much sadder story than junk econ and junk psychology, which seem more like the products of ambitious careerists who, for a couple of decades, stumbled upon a way to hack the system of scientific publication and publicity at the nexus of academia and the news media.

The other twist is that even the opponents of string theory still characterize it as having some mathematical interest–their criticism is not that string theory is being done, so much with that too much is being claimed for it. That’s different than research in himmicanes, air rage, beauty-and-sex-ratio, extra-sensory perception, etc., which is pretty much unmitigated crap, whose only contribution to science has been to reveal the rotten core of science as it is often practiced.

This also gives different flavors to the discussions in these two fields. With psychology and economics, the frustration is mostly external, with observers being bothered that bad work gets so much publicity, that methodological criticisms and unsuccessful replications get less notice than problematic work, etc. With physics, the frustration seems mostly internal, with people bothered that the top physics students are going into what they perceive as a dead-end world. In physics, the concern is with the misuse of human resources in the form of brilliant Ph.D. students. In psychology and econ, the concern is with the bad work giving the general public a misleading view of science and perhaps leading to bad policies (Excel error, anyone?). Nobody’s saying it’s too bad Brian Wansink and Dan Ariely got into this social priming stuff or otherwise they could’ve made major discoveries.