Olympic Citius Altius Fortius Pan-American: The U.S. Olympic Committee's Exclusive Rights
Citizen Media Law Project 2012-08-16
Summary:
The U.S. Olympic Committee ("USOC") has a reputation for aggressively policing their exclusive rights to certain words, phrases, and symbols. And they have a special act of Congress to back them up.
The Ted Stevens Olympic & Amateur Sports Act (hereafter "the Act") grants the USOC the exclusive right to use the word "Olympic," and other Olympic related terms and symbols, and therefore the right to prohibit certain commercial or promotional uses by others. The Act allows the USOC to license use of the marks to contributors and suppliers of goods or services who wish to advertise that "the contributions, goods, or services were donated or supplied to, or approved, selected or used by [the USOC]."
(a) Exclusive Right of Corporation. ‒ Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, the corporation has the exclusive right to use ‒
(1) the name "United States Olympic Committee";
(2) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5 interlocking rings, the symbol of the International Paralympic Committee, consisting of 3 TaiGeuks, or the symbol of the Pan-American Sports Organization, consisting of a torch surrounded by concentric rings;
(3) the emblem of the corporation, consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; and
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", "Paralympic", "Paralympiad", "Pan-American", "America Espirito Sport Fraternite", or any combination of those words.
36 U.S.C. § 220506(a).
The Act was passed in 1978 with the purpose of protecting the USOC's ability to generate the funds necessary to send American athletes to the Olympic Games. The USOC is a non-profit corporation chartered by Congress to coordinate, promote, and govern all international amateur athletic activities in the United States. The Act was amended in 1998, but other than some rearranging of wording, the only substantial difference to § 220506 is the addition of subsection (d) that excludes geographic reference rights (in the State of Washington west of the Cascade Mountain range, thus protecting the good people of Olympia) from the grasp of the USOC's exclusive use.
The Supreme Court analyzed the original version of the Act in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987). In that case, the USOC successfully obtained an injunction against the SFAA for their use of "Gay Olympic Games" to describe and to promote the athletic competition they sponsored. The Court's reasoning was murky, but ultimately held that the Act did not violate the First Amendment when granting exclusive use of the word "Olympic" without requiring the USOC to prove that an unauthorizeduse is likely to cause confusion. ("Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing.") The Court relied legislative history ‒ and the apparently meaningful lack of a comma in the statute (then appearing at 36 U.S.C. § 380):
(a) Unauthorized use; civil action; lawful use prior to September 21, 1950
Without the consent of the Corporation, any person who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition--
(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5 interlocking rings;
(2) the emblem of the Corporation, consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief;
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee or the Corporation; or
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", or any combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the Corporation or any Olympic activity;
shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the Corporation for the remedies provided in the Act or July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the Trademark Act of 1946) [15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 et seq.]. ...
36 U.S.C. § 380(a) (emphasis added).
See, there's no comma between "any combination or simulation thereof" and "tending to cause confusion," which of course means that the likelihood of confusion requirement only applies to combinations or simulations of the words at issue, and not