Four Obstacles to Local Surveillance Ordinances

In a previous piece, one of us (Fidler) analyzed ordinances in 14 localities that govern how local police can surveil residents. Her related paper in the Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal concludes that these laws have so far been reasonably successful. Media and advocacy reports indicated that a set of other cities—St. Louis, Missouri; Northampton, Massachusetts; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Hartford, Connecticut; and Miami Beach, Florida—are in the process of developing similar laws. But progress on such laws in most of these cities has been stalled for years. Why have these efforts failed when efforts in other cities succeeded?

Our research reveals four common traits that seemed to thwart initial efforts to establish local civilian control over law enforcement surveillance in these cities. Substantial objections from “strong” mayors and close ties between the police and lawmakers are the first two. In addition, ordinances tended to struggle when narratives about the ordinance became overly centered on surveillance cameras or dominated by messaging about government overreach or threats to public safety. Although we remain optimistic about local control over surveillance, identifying these traits helps shed light on the drawbacks of a city council-led approach. We also hope that identifying these traits can help policy advocates assess the local landscape before launching campaigns and better prepare to meet these obstacles.

Objections From “Strong” Mayors

Three of the five cities with stalled proposals had strong mayors who objected to the ordinances. Cities in the U.S. are sometimes described as having either “strong” or “weak” mayors. These terms indicate the relative power of the executive compared to the legislative branch within municipal government. For our purposes, we define strong mayors as those who possess veto powers and absolute appointment powers for administrative heads, and semi-strong mayors as those who possess only veto power. St. Louis, Hartford and Northampton all have strong or semi-strong mayors who objected to the proposed ordinances. The mayor’s office in St. Louis blindsided the legislative sponsors of the city’s surveillance bill with its own proposed executive order in 2019, accompanied by a statement that the “accountability of how the city uses surveillance technology needs to rest firmly on the Mayor.” The mayor’s office also slow-walked its cooperation with the council’s requests for information that would inform the drafting process, delaying developments on the bill by at least 6 months. In Hartford, the mayor did not weigh in on the ordinance directly but actively supported increasing police surveillance technology at the time the ordinance was under consideration.

Northampton’s mayor in 2017 also vetoed its surveillance ordinance. This veto was unusual, though: The mayor issued a veto on the grounds that the ordinance was not comprehensive enough. Council members indicated that they were surprised by the mayor’s late-in-the game objection. Perhaps the mayor’s desire was sincere, or perhaps it was a convenient rationale for a veto, but the end result was the same: No ordinance passed. Overall, objections from a strong mayor do not automatically doom a local surveillance ordinance, but they do make passage more difficult.

Strong Police Lobbying Power

Strong police lobbying power seems particularly effective in stopping an ordinance’s progress early on. In four cities we examined—Ann Arbor, Hartford, St. Louis and Miami Beach—the proposed ordinances never reached the mayor’s desk, and, in each, the police were vocal in their opposition from the start. Ann Arbor’s police chief did not voice his “complete and unequivocal support,” without which council members hesitated to move forward. Hartford’s police chief expressed