The Dark World Of Jihadist Propaganda Channels On Telegram

Following the crackdown on Ansaru jihadist accounts on Facebook and WhatsApp in Feb. 2023, the group has shifted its operations to Telegram, a messaging app that has been a favoured platform for extremists due to the relative discreteness it comes with. 

In Jan. 2023, a group was formed and named Mahanga TV after some Ansaru members reported losing their Facebook accounts. The group was initially made public and promoted up till early February. However, it was later converted into a private channel that requires an invitation for membership. The group deliberately adopted a pseudonym that could potentially mislead analysts and counter-terrorists into associating it with a distinct online media platform that shares a similar name. 

A screenshot of Ansaru Telegram group promoting JNIM propaganda, dated June 12, 2023.

Ansaru’s decision to transition to Telegram was a carefully considered move. The platform’s appeal to extremists lies in its array of features, including encrypted messaging and streamlined private group creation. These surpass the capabilities of similar platforms like Rocket Chat and Elements – which are also favoured by jihadists.  Telegram’s most significant feature is the ability to create bots: automated chat partners that perform predetermined tasks around the clock. 

Bots have become an important tool among extremists for their ability to efficiently spread propaganda, streamline communication, and maintain a constant online presence. Jihadists are utilising the innate capabilities of bots to their advantage, enabling them to operate 24/7 and disseminate a continuous flow of extremist material to their intended audience. 

Telegram’s bot detection system can remove bots that are reported, but many bots are able to evade detection by avoiding certain words and images that could be flagged by moderators. This can include altering specific words or using a mix of different languages to avoid detection. HumAngle recently found that jihadists used emojis specifically to dodge detection efforts. 

Ansaru members are stepping up their efforts to use social media platforms for radicalisation and to plan a resurgence. The jihadists use private Telegram channels to discuss propaganda and other jihadi-related topics, primarily in Hausa and Arabic languages. And from there, they carry out activities on open platforms such as TikTok. 

A screenshot of an account on TikTok promoting Ansaru propaganda and gaining thousands of views.

Despite social media companies’ attempts to curb extremism, the terror groups appear undeterred. The aim is to inspire new members and extremists to take action rather than simply promote their cause on social media.

Ansaru’s shift to Telegram indicates their ability to adjust to the evolving social media terrain. With Facebook and WhatsApp ramping up their efforts to eliminate extremist content, groups such as Ansaru have been compelled to consolidate on Telegram for communication.

The platform has provided an opportunity for individuals to share content that would typically be subject to removal by other platforms, including graphic videos, incendiary and hateful language, and depictions of child soldiers. 

Through monitoring various bots and chat groups, HumAngle has gained valuable insight into the discussions, audio recordings, channel promotions, and propaganda videos being shared by the terrorists. 

In just four months, the group’s membership surged from 10 to over 30. Four administrators shared materials, moderated the conversations, and coordinated the group’s activities. 

Ansaru, a jihadist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, broke away from Boko Haram in 2012. Also known as Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), the group operates primarily in the Northwest and North-central regions of Nigeria. 

It was found to have conducted abductions and assaults on Nigerian security forces and Western targets, especially between 2012 and 2013. But it has been responsible for relatively less violence, compared to other local extremist groups such as Jama’atu Ahlussunnah Liddaawati Wal Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). 

The group’s main target is foreigners, particularly those from&l