IntelBrief: Azerbaijan Seizes Control of Nagorno-Karabakh

On September 19, Azerbaijan began a military operation, including air strikes on military targets manned by ethnic Armenian separatists, to seize full control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Armenia have feuded over Karabakh, which is inhabited by an estimated 120,000 ethnic Armenians who constitute 95% of the population and run a self-declared autonomous administration. The enclave is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. The operation was intended to complete Baku’s goal of reversing its defeat in the first post-Soviet war over Karabakh in which Armenia forces, by 1994, seized control of not only the Karabakh territory itself but also most of its surrounding districts. Retrained and re-armed with weapons from Türkiye, including the sophisticated Bayraktar (TB-2) armed drones, Azerbaijan’s forces recaptured the districts surrounding Karabakh in 2020, and maintained those gains under a ceasefire brokered by Russia and monitored by a contingent of 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops.

Over the past several weeks, Azerbaijani forces and irregular surrogates have encroached on a corridor of territory, the Lachin Corridor, that connects Armenia to Karabakh, including blocking the delivery of humanitarian supplies and exports to the Karabakh population. Converting its pressure on Karabakh into a full-scale drive to seize control over it, Baku called its September 19 attack an “anti-terror” operation, even though the assault was not responding to any reported provocation coming from the enclave. Upon launching its assault, Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry said it was using “high-precision weapons” to “incapacitate” Armenian-backed forces and force out “formations of Armenia’s armed forces.” However, Armenia did not have troops deployed in the enclave, and neither Yerevan nor Russian peacekeepers intervened to stop Baku’s advance. The overmatched ethnic Armenian separatists in the territory quickly agreed to lay down their weapons as part of a Russian-brokered “ceasefire” that accepts Azerbaijani control of Nagorno-Karabakh. The death toll in the two days of fighting varied between 25 and 200, depending on the sources reporting casualty figures.

Baku’s offensive represented President Ilham Aliyev’s calculation that regional and global conditions set the stage for Azerbaijan to establish control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian forces were not willing or able to break through Azerbaijan’s blockade of the roads into the territory. Russia, the only power able to quickly deploy enough force to stop Azerbaijan’s advance, is an ally of Armenia and committed to its defense under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that groups Russia and five post-Soviet states – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. However, Aliyev’s government assessed, correctly it seems, that Russia is consumed by battlefield difficulties in its war with Ukraine and would not be willing to intervene militarily. Iran – increasingly aligned with Russia strategically – is another adversary of Azerbaijan and supporter of Armenia, even though the Iranian and Azeri people share much common history and adherence to Shia Islam. However, Iran’s forces are spread thin on the country’s borders and throughout the broader region, and Azerbaijan assessed that Tehran was in no position to militarily assist the Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani officials also expressed confidence that they had the unwavering backing of Türkiye, which helped Baku rearm and has supported its efforts to confront Ankara’s historic adversary, Armenia.

Baku benefitted from its cooperation with both Washington and Tel Aviv by offering the use of strategic facilities to conduct surveillance and launch covert operations against Iran – giving Baku confidence that the United States would mute its condemnation of the Azerbaijani offensive. Aliyev apparently judged accurately that Washington would not intervene directly to halt the Azerbaijani advance, despite the substantial support for the Armenian people in the U.S. Congress. Rather, reflecting the U.S. assessment of Azerbaijan’s strategic value in containing Iran, Secretary of State Antony Blinken did not condemn Baku’s offensive, instead appealing for an end to hostilities and dialogue to resolve the conflict in calls to Aliyev as well as Armenia’s Pr